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Allais paradoxa while they offer an interesting explanation for their occurrence.
However, experimental data suggest a systematic violation of these models when
lotteries with low probabilities of bad or good outcomes are involved. The present
paper develops an axiomatic model that allows for thresholds in the perception of
security and potential levels. The derived representation of preferences accomo-
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1 Introduction
In a well-known study on the psychology of decision making under risk, Lopes (1987)
concluded that a decision maker takes into account three different factors while evaluat-
ing lotteries: What is the expected utility of this lottery? What is the worst outcome I
can end up with by choosing this lottery (i.e. what is the security level of this lottery)?
What is the best outcome I can end up with (i.e. what is the potential level)? This
conclusion motivated Cohen (1992) to develop a three-criteria decision model which gen-
eralizes expected utility by allowing for security level and potential level considerations.
An extension of this model has been provided by Essid (1997). Earlier models of Gilboa
(1988) and Jaffray (1988) are very similar to Cohen’s model but restrict attention to
the security level alone. All three approaches explain Allais paradoxa by discontinuities
of preferences resulting from the different security and potential levels of the lotteries
involved. More recently, Cahteauneuf et al. (2003), building upon earlier work of Dow
and Werlang (1994) and Eichberger and Kelsey (1999), have integrated Cohen’s ideas
in a model of decision making under uncertainty.
The accommodation of Allais paradoxa by the security level and potential level (SL-
PL) models is in our view intuitively very appealing. However, SL-PL models exhibit
two major problems. First, they perform descriptively rather poorly when they are
confronted with experimental data that go beyond the classical Allais paradoxa. A
second and somewhat more fundamental problem can be characterized as follows: in
real life there is always an (arbitrarily) small chance of immediate death and also a tiny
chance of finding a suitcase on the street containing a huge cash amount of say ten
billion dollars. Thus, it may be argued that in all decision problems death is always the
security level while the amount of ten billion dollars is the potential level. If the security
and potential levels are, however, identical in all lotteries, SL-PL models simply reduce
to expected utility.
This second problem indicates that the shortcoming of SL-PL models is not so much
owed to their assumption of security and potential considerations in general but rather
to their assumption that security and potential considerations refer exclusively to the
worst, respectively best, outcome in the support of a lottery, regardless of how small
their probability actually is. This motivated us to develop an axiomatic model which
extends existing SL-PL models by so-called thresholds such that security or potential
considerations become only relevant if the probabilities of bad, respectively good, out-
comes are not below some perceptual threshold level. For example, a lottery may be
still perceived as very secure as long as bad outcomes realize with very small probability.
Accordingly, a lottery may be associated with a low potential when the probability of a
high outcome is only small for this lottery. It turns out that the introduction of threshold
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also resolves the first problem: as shown below, the poor descriptive performance of the
original SL-PL models can be significantly improved by the introduction of thresholds.
Empirical observations that people often neglect very small probabilities (cf. Sjo¨berg
(1999), (2000) and Stone, Yates, and Parker (1994)) can be regarded as further evidence
in favor of thresholds: if the worst (respectively best) outcome has a very small probabil-
ity, it seems unreasonable that people attach psychological importance to this outcome
by regarding it as security (respectively potential) level and, at the same time, neglect
its probability.
An analogous concept to our notion of thresholds can be seen in the Value-at-Risk
(VaR) which is defined as the worst loss for a given confidence level (mostly 99%). More
precisely, for a confidence level of 99% the VaR of a lottery equals x if the cumulative
probability of outcomes smaller than x is given by 1%. The VaR has recently become
very popular as a risk measure and it seems reasonable to consider the VaR as security
level which is perfectly consistent with our model but not compatible with the original
SL-PL models.
A further characteristic of our model is that it assumes a weaker version of indepen-
dence than in the original SL-PL models: the risk-attitudes of a decision maker may
depend in our model also on security and potential considerations. For example, our
model allows for the possibility that decision makers are less risk averse for choice be-
tween insecure lotteries than for choice between secure lotteries. This is not the case
for the original SL-PL models: because the utility functions for different security and
potential levels differ in these models only by affine transformations, the risk attitudes
are the same accross different security and potial levels.
The introduction of thresholds appears to us as a natural extension of SL-PL models,
and, together with our weakened version of the independence axiom, it can successfully
explain the most persistent choice patterns that are inconsistent with the original SL-PL
models. Thus, as the main contribution of this paper, we demonstrate that the security
and potential considerations of SL-PL models can go along with descriptive power under
the intuitively appealing assumptions that the perception of security and of potential
may depend on thresholds and that the risk attitudes of decision makers may depend
on the security and potential levels involved.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section introduces the original SL-PL models
and presents the typical experimental designs in which violations of these models have
been observed. Section 3 introduces our proposal for a partition of a set of lotteries into
subsets of different security and potential levels with respect to thresholds. In section 4
we introduce our axioms and state two representation theorems: the first representation
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allows for violations of monotonicity with respect to first-order stochastic dominance
whereas the second representation excludes such violations. In section 5 we demonstrate
how the evidence against the original SL-PL models can be accommodated within our
framework. All formal proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 The original SL-PL models
In contrast to other alternatives to expected utility like models with the betweenness-
property or rank dependent utility models (see, e.g., Karni and Schmeidler (1991),
Starmer (2000), and Schmidt (2003) for surveys), SL-PL models presume that disconti-
nuities in the preferences describe best what is psychologically happening when decision
makers commit Allais paradoxa: as an extension to expected utility security and poten-
tial factors may lead to jumps in the preferences such that a secure (respectively high
potential) lottery dominates now all insecure (respectively low potential) lotteries that
are sufficiently close in the sense of some mathematically defined neighborhood.
Let x and y denote the worst and best outcomes of the lottery σ. Then the utility
of a lottery σ is in Cohen’s model given by
V (σ) = a(x, y) ∗ EU(σ) + b(x, y),
where EU(σ) denotes the standard expected utility of σ and a(x, y) and b(x, y) are
constants depending on the given security and potential level of σ. The models of
Gilboa (1988) and Jaffray (1988) are similar but restrict attention to the security level
x.
In the following we present experimental data of Sopher and Gigliotti (1993) and
Chew and Waller (1986), which demonstrate that a majority of decision makers violates
the SL-PL models in a very systematic way despite the fact that these models deal
successfully with classical Allais paradoxa.
Problem 1. Consider the following three pairs of lotteries where, e.g., ($1M · 1)
denotes a lottery that gives $1 Mill. with probability one:
S1 = ($1M · 1) R1 = ($0 · 0.01⊕ $1M · 0.89⊕ $5M · 0.10)
S2 = ($0 · 0.89⊕ $1M · 0.11⊕ $5M · 0) R2 = ($0 · 0.9⊕ $1M · 0⊕ $5M · 0.10)
S3 = ($0 · 0⊕ $1M · 0.11⊕ $5M · 0.89) R3 = ($0 · 0.01⊕ $1M · 0⊕ $5M · 0.99)
A decision maker with the choice pattern (S1, R2), i.e., preferring S1 to R1 and
preferring R2 to S2, commits the classical Allais paradox. The existing SL-PL models
can accommodate this Allais paradox via the security effect: At first a decision maker
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prefers the secure lottery S1 to the insecure lottery R1 because by the security effect
her evaluation of lotteries experiences an upward-jump when the probability of the bad
outcome $0 drops to zero. However, after substituting the bad outcome $0 for the
outcome $1M with probability weigt 0.89 in the lotteries S1 andR1 there is no longer any
security effect when the resulting lotteries S2 and R2 are compared and as a consequence
R2 may now become preferred to S2 as observed in the Allais paradox.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
However, the occurrence of this security effect implies for the original SL-PL models
that the decision maker must prefer S3 to R3 (see figure 1). Sopher and Gigliotti (1993)
have elicited preferences for these three choice pairs and according to their results 45
individuals have chosen (S1, R2, S3) whereas 58 individuals have chosen (S1, R2, R3).
That is, the majority of decision makers who commit this classical Allais paradox have
displayed preferences that are not compatible with existing SL-PL models.
Problem 2. Consider now the following three pairs of lotteries
Q1 = ($40 · 1) T1 = ($0 · 0.5⊕ $100 · 0.5)
Q2 = ($40 · 1) T2 = ($0 · 0.05⊕ $40 · 0.90⊕ $100 · 0.05)
Q3 = ($0 · 0.9⊕ $40 · 0.10) T3 = ($0 · 0.95⊕ $100 · 0.05)
A decision maker with the choice pattern (Q1, T2) commits another classical Allais
paradox that is typically observed for moderate payoffs or losses. This choice behavior
can not be accommodated by the security level models of Gilboa (1988) and Jaffray
(1988), however, it is possible to accommodate this choice behavior within Cohen’s
model by a potential effect.
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
The assumption of this potential effect implies in Cohen’s model that the decision
maker prefers also Q3 to T3 (see figure 2). But Chew and Waller’s (1986) experimental
data display this choice pattern (Q1, T2, Q3) only for 12 individuals whereas the choice
pattern (Q1, T2, T3) appears for 28 individuals. Again the vast majority of decision
makers who commit a classical Allais paradox violate preferences that are admissible for
the existing SL-PL models.
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A closer examination of problem 1 and of problem 2 reveals that SL-PL models
are violated when lotteries become involved such that bad outcomes or good outcomes
realize with rather small probability. We think therefore that the key for solving these
systematic violations of SL-PL models is a departure from the assumption that a lottery
is not secure, or is a high potential lottery, just because bad, respectively good, outcomes
realize with positive probability. In contrast, our SL-PL model with thresholds, will allow
to perceive lotteries as secure (of low potential) when the bad (good) outcomes realize
only with sufficiently small probabilities.
3 Security and Potential Levels with Thresholds
The objective for our particular formalism of thresholds has been twofold. First, we
wanted to keep the model as simple as possible. As a consequence we introduce only
two new parameters to the original SL-PL models, a threshold for security levels and
a threshold for potential levels, whereby the security level and the potential level of a
lottery is then easily determined by its cumulative distribution function. More sophis-
ticated SL-PL models with thresholds could be constructed, however, we are willingly
trading off richness of the model for a simple formalism that captures well the basic idea.
Secondly, we introduce a formalism of thresholds such that the resulting preferences will
not necessarily violate monotonicity with respect to first-order stochastic dominance
(FOSD). The original SL-PL models do not violate this fundamental requirement for
rational decision makers, however, one can easily construct proposals for thresholds for
which the discontinuous preferences of SL-PL models lead to violations of monotonicity
with respect to FOSD.
Let X = {x1, ..., xn} denote a finite set of totally ordered deterministic outcomes
with x1 < ... < xn, and let 4 (X) denote the set of all probability distributions, i.e.,
lotteries, over X. A lottery σ ∈ 4 (X) is also written as (σ1 · x1 ⊕ ...⊕ σn · xn) where
σk denotes the probability by which outcome xk realizes. Let F [σ] (xk) denote the
cumulative distribution function of lottery σ evaluated at outcome xk. For so-called
thresholds ε, η ∈ [0, 1) denote by Π (ε, η) a collection of sets
Π (ε, η) = {4 (xj, xk)}j=1,...,n;k≥j
such that
σ ∈ 4 (xj, xk) iff F [σ] (xj−1) ≤ ε, F [σ] (xj) > ε AND 1−F [σ] (xk) ≤ η, 1−F [σ] (xk−1) > η
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Observation: Π (ε, η) is a partition of 4 (X) with convex cells 4 (x, y) ∈ Π(ε, η).
Moreover, for ε+ η < 1 these cells are non-empty.
We say a lottery σ ∈ 4 (x, y), with 4 (x, y) ∈ Π(ε, η), has security level x and po-
tential level y. The threshold-value ε for security levels guarantees that worse outcomes
than x can realize for a lottery of security level x at most with probability ε. Accord-
ingly, better outcomes than y can realize for a lottery of potential level y at most with
probability η. For ε, η = 0 the partition Π (ε, η) reduces to the original SL-PL partition
of Cohen (1992) where the security level of a lottery is the worst outcome in its support
and the potential level is the best outcome in the support, i.e., σ ∈ 4 (x, y) if and only
if x = minSupport (σ) and y = maxSupport (σ).
4 Axiomatic Analysis
Existing axiomatizations of SL-PL models presume basically that the axioms of ex-
pected utility theory remain valid within security and potential level subsets whereas
the independence axiom and continuity may be violated while passing from one subset
to another. However, some weakened version of the independence axiom and of the
Archimedean axiom have to be satisfied between different subsets in order to obtain a
simple real-valued utility representation. Apart from introducing threshold our axiom-
atization differs from Cohen’s (1992) model by imposing only a weakened variant of her
independence axiom. As a consequence of this weakening we can accommodate indif-
ference curves with different slopes on different SL-PL subsets such that there may be
different risk attitudes within different SL-PL subsets. We employ the following three
axioms:
A1-Ordering: Asymmetry, Transitivity and Completeness of the strict preference
relation  on 4 (X).
A2-Subset Dependent Archimedean Axiom: Suppose σ ∈ 4 (x, y) and ρ, τ ∈
4 (x′, y′) for 4 (x, y) ,4 (x′, y′) ∈ Π(ε, η). If τ  σ  ρ then
λ · τ ⊕ (1− λ) · ρ ∼ σ
for a unique λ ∈ (0, 1).
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A3-Subset Dependent Independence Axiom: Suppose 4 (x, y) ,4 (x′, y′) ∈
Π(ε, η). If there exist lotteries σ, τ ∈ 4 (x, y) and lotteries σ′, τ ′ ∈ 4 (x′, y′) such that
σ  (∼)σ′ and τ  (∼) τ ′ then
λ · σ ⊕ (1− λ) · τ  (∼)λ · σ′ ⊕ (1− λ) · τ ′
for all λ ∈ (0, 1).
We define now a subset-dependent expected utility functional V : 4 (X)×Π(ε, η)→
R+ by
V (σ,4 (x, y)) =
n∑
k=1
σ (xk) ∗ u (xk,4 (x, y)) (1)
with u : X × Π(ε, η)→ R+.
Theorem 1:
Let preferences on 4 (X) satisfy the axioms (A1)-(A3) for some partition Π(ε, η) with
ε+η < 1. Then these preferences are representable by a utility function U : 4 (X)→ R+
such that
U (σ) = V (σ,4 (x, y))
with σ ∈ 4 (x, y), whereby the function V is defined in (1).
Conversely, any such U represents preferences that fulfil the axioms (A1)-(A3).
The representation of Theorem 1 allows for preferences that may violate monotonicity
w.r.t. FOSD. However, one main motivation for our particular definition of thresholds
was the desire to introduce SL-PL partitions such that preferences may be consistent
with FOSD as in the original SL-PL models. We will now derive a second representation
theorem which will guarantee consistency with FOSD.
Recall the definition of first-order stochastic dominance: A lottery σ dominates a
lottery τ w.r.t. FOSD, i.e., σ FOSD τ , if and only if F [σ] (x) ≤ F [τ ] (x) for all
x ∈ X. Moreover, if additionally F [σ] (x) < F [τ ] (x) for some x ∈ X we say that σ
dominates a lottery τ strictly w.r.t. FOSD and we write then σ FOSD τ . Verify the
following two properties of FOSD that will be exploited later on in the proof of the
second representation theorem:
Continuity: Suppose (σk)k∈N with limk→∞ σk = σ. If there is a τ such that τ FOSD
σk for all k ∈ N then τ FOSD σ.
Quasiconcavity: If τ FOSD σ then λ · τ ⊕ (1− λ) · σ FOSD σ for all λ ∈ (0, 1).
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Consistency of preferences with FOSD is guaranteed by the following condition:
A4-Monotonicity with respect to FOSD: If σ FOSD τ then σ  τ ; and if
σ FOSD τ then σ  τ .
Adding (A4) to the axiomatic system of Theorem 1 leads to the second representation
theorem.
Theorem 2:
Let preferences on 4 (X) satisfy the axioms (A1)-(A4) for some partition Π(ε, η) with
ε+η < 1. Then these preferences are representable by a utility function U : 4 (X)→ R+
such that
U (σ) = V (σ,4 (x, y)) (2)
for σ ∈ 4 (x, y), whereby the function V defined in (1) has the following properties
(i) for all 4 (x, y) ∈ Π(ε, η)
u (xm,4 (x, y)) < u (xm+1,4 (x, y)) (3)
with 1 ≤ m ≤ n− 1,
(ii)
lim
k→∞
V (σk,4 (x, y)) ≤ V (σ,4 (x¯, y¯)) (4)
for any sequence (σk)k∈N with limk→∞ σk = σ , σk ∈ 4 (x, y) for all k ∈ N , and
σ ∈ 4 (x¯, y¯) with x¯ ≥ x, y¯ ≥ y,
(iii)
V (σ,4 (x, y)) ≤ lim
k→∞
V (σk,4 (x¯, y¯)) (5)
for any sequence (σk)k∈N with limk→∞ σk = σ , σk ∈ 4 (x¯, y¯) for all k ∈ N , and
σ ∈ 4 (x, y) with x¯ ≥ x, y¯ ≥ y.
Conversely, any such U represents preferences that fulfil the axioms (A1)-(A4).
For arbitrary functions V (·,4 (x, y)) and V (·,4 (x¯, y¯)) it may not be obvious whether
the conditions (4) and (5) are satisfied, or not. But observe that (4) and (5) are trivially
fulfilled for vNM-utility indices u (xk, ·) that are monotonic on Π (ε, η) for all xk ∈ X.
As a consequence we can immediately derive the following corollary:
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Corollary 1:
Any utility function U : 4 (X)→ R+ with
U (σ) = V (σ,4 (x, y))
for σ ∈ 4 (x, y), with V defined in (1), is representing preferences that fulfil the axioms
(A1)-(A4) if we have for all xk ∈ X
u (xk,4 (x, y)) ≤ u (xk,4 (x¯, y¯))
with x¯ ≥ x, y¯ ≥ y.
5 Accommodating the Experimental Evidence
Our formalism of thresholds presented in section 3 is clearly a very idealizing concept
and, therefore, it seems unreasonable that this concept can capture all empirical choice
patterns which may be associated with the existence of thresholds in a decisionmaker’s
evaluation of lotteries. We have focused on our simple concept of a SL-PL partition, with
only two parameters more than Cohen’s original SL-PL partition, because we wanted to
obtain a model which is as simple as possible while it can solve the two major problems
concerning the original SL-PL models mentioned in the introduction.
It remains to show that our model of SL-PL preferences with thresholds can indeed
accommodate the observed choice patterns of the two problems presented in section 2
which violate the original SL-PL models. In the following analysis, the employed utility
values fulfil the assumptions of the Corollary 1 such that monotonicity with respect to
first-order stochastic dominance is satisfied.
Problem 1. (See figure 3) Consider the following specification of the utility function
for a SL-PL partition Π (ε, η), with ε = 0.01 and η = 0:
For security level $1M
u ($0,4 ($1M, y)) = 0 for $1M ≤ y ≤ $5M
u ($1M,4 ($1M, y)) = 0.99 for $1M ≤ y ≤ $5M
u ($5M,4 ($1M, y)) = 1 for $1M ≤ y ≤ $5M
For security level $0
u ($0,4 ($0, y)) = 0 for $0 ≤ y ≤ $5M
u ($1M,4 ($0, y)) = (0.99)100 for $0 ≤ y ≤ $5M
u ($5M,4 ($0, y)) = 1 for $0 ≤ y ≤ $5M
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For security level $5M
u ($0,4 ($5M, y)) = 0 for y = $5M
u ($1M,4 ($5M, y)) = 1.98 for y = $5M
u ($5M,4 ($5M, y)) = 2 for y = $5M
When we compute now the utility numbers for the lotteries in problem 1 we obtain the
desired choice pattern (S1, R2, R3)
U (S1) = V (S1,4 ($1M, $1M)) = 0.99
> 0.9811 = V (R1,4 ($1M, $1M)) = U (R1)
U (S2) = V (S2,4 ($0, $1M)) = 0.04
< 0.1 = V (R2,4 ($0, $1M)) = U (R2)
U (S3) = V (S3,4 ($1M, $5M)) = 0.999
< 1.98 = V (R3,4 ($5M, $5M)) = U (R3)
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
Problem 2. (See figure 4) Consider the following specification of the utility function
for a SL-PL partition Π (ε, η), with ε = 0.05 and η = 0:
For security level $0
u ($0,4 ($0, y)) = 0 for $0 ≤ y ≤ $100M
u ($40,4 ($0, y)) = 0.4 for $0 ≤ y ≤ $100M
u ($100,4 ($0M, y)) = 1 for $0 ≤ y ≤ $100M
For security levels $40 and $100
u ($0,4 (x, y)) = 1 for $40 ≤ x ≤ y ≤ $100
u ($40,4 (x, y)) = 1.4 for $40 ≤ x ≤ y ≤ $100
u ($100,4 (x, y)) = 2 for $40 ≤ x ≤ y ≤ $100
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Computing then the utility numbers for the lotteries in problem 2 gives the desired
choice pattern (Q1, T2, T3)
U (Q1) = V (Q1,4 ($40, $40)) = 1.4
> 0.2 = V (T1,4 ($0, $100)) = U (T1)
U (Q2) = V (Q2,4 ($40, $40)) = 1.4
< 1.41 = V (T2,4 ($40, $40)) = U (R2)
U (Q3) = V (Q3,4 ($0, $40)) = 0.04
< 0.05 = V (T3,4 ($0, $40)) = U (T3)
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
Remark 1. Compared to the original SL-PL models the accommodation of the
choice pattern (Q1, T2, T3) in problem 2 requires only a positive threshold-value whereas
the accommodation of (S1, R2, R3) in problem 1 requires additionally our weakened ver-
sion of the independence axiom: When the slopes of the indifference curves are the same
across different SL-PL subsets (as implied by the original SL-PL models) we could not
have (S1, R2) because the lotteries S1, R1, on the one hand, and the lotteries S2, R2,
on the other hand, have in our SL-PL partition the same security and potential levels.
Thus, if we assumed the independence axiom of the original SL-PL models for our SL-
PL partition then S1 is preferred to R1 if and only if S2 is preferred to R2. Observe
that the subset-dependent expected utility functional V (·,4 ($0, y)) results from a con-
vex transformation of the subset-dependent expected utility functional V (·,4 ($1M, y))
which implies steeper slopes of the indifference curves on SL-PL subsets with higher
security levels. In analogy to the comparison of risk attitudes within the expected util-
ity framework we could say that the decision maker of our representation makes riskier
choices when she has to decide between low-security lotteries as when she has to decide
between high-security lotteries. In our opinion such security and potential level depen-
dent risk-attitudes can make some intuitive sense and they could be justified, e.g., by
the following rationale: If I feel that there are only insecure alternatives I can choose
from, then I might go as well for riskier alternatives.
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Remark 2. Although the choice pattern (Q1, T2) violates the original security
level models of Gilboa (1988) and of Jaffray (1988) it can be accommodated within
Cohen’s SL-PL model under the assumption of a potential effect (which had actually been
introduced by Cohen (1992) for accommodating typical violations of expected utility
preferences when losses are considered as outcomes). However, it can be easily shown
that the occurrence of a potential effect implies then also Q3  T3 in Cohen’s model
(compare figure 2). In contrast, our model can explain (Q1, T2, T3) by the occurrence of
a security effect under the assumption that the lottery T2 is considered as comparably
safe. That is, the 0.05 chance of ending up with the bad outcome of $0 does not bother
here the decision maker that much as to let her evaluation of this lottery be affected by
security consideration with respect to the secure lottery Q2.
Remark 3. Motivated by the discussion whether Allais paradoxa are persistently
committed within the interior of the Marschak-Machina triangle, or not, Harless and
Camerer (1994) conclude after a broad statistical investigation of experiments: ”The
conjecture that EU violations disappear in the interior appears to be false.” The orig-
inal SL-PL models can not take account of Allais paradoxa that are committed within
the interior of the Marschak-Machina triangle, however, the introduction of thresholds
implies obviously violations of EU-theory within the interior of the Marschak-Machina
triangles that may follow quite complex patterns according to the specification of thresh-
old values.
6 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of the observation: Convexity of each SL-PL subset 4 (x, y) is obviously
implied by the definition of the cumulative distribution function. By the same argument
we see immediately that Π (ε, η) is a partition of 4 (X) regardless of the values of ε and
η:
i.) 4 (x, y) ∩4 (x′, y′) = ∅ for 4 (x, y) 6= 4 (x′, y′) and
ii.) ⋃
{(x,y)∈X×X|x≤y}
4 (x, y) = 4 (X)
It remains to show that each is SL-PL subset 4 (x, y) is non-empty if ε + η < 1. Just
observe that there exists always the lottery(
ε+
1− η − ε
2
)
· x⊕
(
η +
1− η − ε
2
)
· y ∈ 4 (x, y)
for ε+ η < 1.
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Proof of the Representation Theorems
We proceed by proving in detail the second representation theorem whose proof is
more demanding than the proof of the first representation theorem because the prefer-
ences must satisfy here additionally the assumption of monotonicity w.r.t. FOSD. We
will omitt an explicit proof of the first representation theorem because such a proof
coincides basically with our proof of the second representation theorem when we simply
do not take account of the restrictions required by monotonicity w.r.t. FOSD.
Part A. We demonstrate that all preferences on 4 (x, y) fulfilling (A1)-(A4) must
be representable by (2) such that for all 4 (x, y) ∈ Π(ε, η) the V (·,4 (x, y)) are subset-
dependent EU-functionals as defined in (1).
Recall that the assumption of (A1)-(A4) implies that preferences over lotteries within
the same SL-PL subset can be represented by some EU-functional; i.e., for σ, τ ∈ 4 (x, y)
we have σ  τ iff
n∑
k=1
σ (xk) ∗ u (xk,4 (x, y)) >
n∑
k=1
τ (xk) ∗ u (xk,4 (x, y)) (6)
for strictly monotonic u (·,4 (x, y)). This is by definition equivalent to
V (σ,4 (x, y)) > V (τ,4 (x, y))
Presume from now on that the preferences over the lotteries within any SL-PL subset
4 (x, y) ∈ Π(ε, η) are represented by some expected utility function V (·,4 (x, y)).
Observe that by construction of Π (ε, η) and by application of (A2) and (A4)
inf
σ∈4(x,y)
V (σ,4 (x, y)) = V (ε · x1 ⊕ (1− ε− η) · x⊕ η · y,4 (x, y))
sup
σ∈4(x,y)
V (σ,4 (x, y)) = V (ε · x⊕ (1− ε− η) · y ⊕ η · xn,4 (x, y))
and let us introduce the following notational conventions for these particular lotteries
inf4 (x, y) = ε · x1 ⊕ (1− ε− η) · x⊕ η · y (7)
sup4 (x, y) = ε · x⊕ (1− ε− η) · y ⊕ η · xn
The EU-representation V (·,4 (x, y)) of preferences within 4 (x, y) implies then that
there exists for every σ ∈ 4 (x, y) a unique νσ ∈ [0, 1] such that
V (σ,4 (x, y)) = V (νσ · inf4 (x, y)⊕ (1− νσ) · sup4 (x, y) ,4 (x, y)) (8)
= νσ ∗ V (inf4 (x, y) ,4 (x, y)) + (1− νσ) ∗ V (sup4 (x, y) ,4 (x, y))
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Thus, for all preferences fulfilling (A1)-(A4) we can determine by (8) the utility numbers
V (σ,4 (x, y)) for all lotteries σ ∈ 4 (x, y) w.r.t. the utility numbers
V (inf4 (x, y) ,4 (x, y)) , V (sup4 (x, y) ,4 (x, y)) (9)
Verify now the following two properties of the lotteries (7):
(1)
inf4 (x, y) ∈ 4 (x, x)
sup4 (x, y) ∈ 4 (y, y)
That is, inf4 (x, y) and sup4 (x, y) are elements of 4 (x, y) if and only if x = y.
Conversely, all SL-PL subsets4 (x, y) with x < y do neither contain a worst (preference-
minimizing) lottery inf4 (x, y) nor a best (preference-maximizing) lottery sup4 (x, y).
(2) For any 4 (x¯, y¯) ∈ Π(ε, η), with x¯ ≥ x and y¯ ≥ y
sup4 (x¯, y¯) FOSD σ
for all σ ∈ 4 (x, y) with σ 6= sup4 (x, y), and
σ′ FOSD inf4 (x, y)
for all σ′ ∈ 4 (x¯, y¯) with σ′ 6= inf4 (x¯, y¯). (Notice: this is in particular true for x¯ = x
and y¯ = y.)
Presume that V (σ,4 (x, y)) is given for all σ ∈ 4 (x, y). Furthermore, assume for
now that we have also the utility-numbers (9). We are going to show in a first step that
we can then choose for any arbitrary SL-PL subset 4 (x¯, y¯) ∈ Π(ε, η), with x¯ ≥ x and
y¯ ≥ y, some utility function V (·,4 (x¯, y¯)) such that
σ  (∼)σ′ ⇒ V (σ,4 (x, y)) > (=)V (σ′,4 (x¯, y¯)) (10)
for all σ ∈ 4 (x, y) and σ′ ∈ 4 (x¯, y¯) whenever the preferences fulfil (A1)-(A4).
In a second step we demonstrate how the utility numbers
V (inf4 (x, y) ,4 (x, y)) , V (sup4 (x, y) ,4 (x, y)) (11)
V (inf4 (x¯, y¯) ,4 (x¯, y¯)) , V (sup4 (x¯, y¯) ,4 (x¯, y¯))
can be derived for all 4 (x, y) ,4 (x¯, y¯) ∈ Π(ε, η) such that (10) is fulfilled for any
preferences on 4 (X) satisfying (A1)-(A4).
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Step 1. Consider at first the case σ′  σ for all σ ∈ 4 (x, y) and σ′ ∈ 4 (x¯, y¯). Let
inf4 (x¯, y¯) = sup4 (x, y) (12)
sup4 (x¯, y¯) = inf4 (x¯, y¯) + 1
whereby V (σ′,4 (x¯, y¯)) is then determined for all σ′ ∈ 4 (x¯, y¯) by (8). Obviously, (10)
is satisfied.
Consider now the case that preferences overlap, i.e., there is a ρ′ ∈ 4 (x¯, y¯) such that
σ  ρ′ for some σ ∈ 4 (x, y). Observe at first that this is impossible whenever Π (ε, η)
is given such that
sup4 (x, y) = inf4 (x, y)
i.e., ε = η and x = y. Then the first case would apply. But if
sup4 (x, y) > inf4 (x, y)
there must be some τ ∗ ∈ 4 (x, y) and some σ′ ∈ 4 (x¯, y¯) such that
τ ∗  σ′  inf4 (x, y) (13)
Why? If σ  ρ′ just let σ′ = ρ′ and τ ∗ = σ. If σ ∼ ρ′ and ρ′ 6= inf4 (x¯, y¯) there is no
worst lottery in 4 (x¯, y¯) and there must be some σ′ ∈ 4 (x¯, y¯) such that σ  σ′ with
τ ∗ = σ. Moreover, by (A4) σ′  inf4 (x, y). Notice: σ ∼ ρ′ and ρ′ = inf4 (x¯, y¯) then
x < y by (A4). Just let σ′ = ρ′ and observe that there must be some τ ∗ ∈ 4 (x, y) such
that τ ∗  σ because by x < y there is no best lottery in 4 (x¯, y¯).
By (A2) there exists a unique λ ∈ (0, 1) such that
σ′ ∼ λ · τ ∗ ⊕ (1− λ) · inf4 (x, y) = σ∗
and we let
V (σ′,4 (x¯, y¯)) = V (σ∗,4 (x, y)) (14)
If (13) is fulfilled there must also exist a τ ′ ∈ 4 (x¯, y¯) such that
τ ∗ ∼ τ ′  σ′  inf4 (x, y)
Why? By construction of Π (ε, η) we have sup4 (x¯, y¯) FOSD τ ∗ and by continuity of
FOSD we can find for each τ ∗ ∈ 4 (x, y) some ρ such that ρ  τ ∗ by (A4). By (A2)
τ ∗ ∼ µ · ρ⊕ (1− µ) · σ′ = τ ′
for a unique µ ∈ (0, 1). Let
V (τ ′,4 (x¯, y¯)) = V (τ ∗,4 (x, y))
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Observe now that for preferences satisfying (A3) we have
λ · σ′ ⊕ (1− λ) · τ ′ ∼ λ · σ∗ ⊕ (1− λ) · τ ∗
for λ ∈ (0, 1) which can obviously represented by (2) because
V (λ · σ′ ⊕ (1− λ) · τ ′,4 (x¯, y¯)) = λ ∗ V (σ′,4 (x¯, y¯)) + (1− λ) ∗ V (τ ′,4 (x¯, y¯))(15)
= λ ∗ V (σ∗,4 (x, y)) + (1− λ) ∗ V (τ ∗,4 (x, y))
= V (λ · σ∗ ⊕ (1− λ) · τ ∗,4 (x, y)) (16)
for λ ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, by transitivity we can then conclude that (10) is satisfied for
all lotteries in 4 (x, y) and 4 (x¯, y¯).
Step 2. In the following we are going to describe an effective procedure by which
the utility numbers (11) could be derived for all 4 (x, y) ,4 (x¯, y¯) ∈ Π(ε, η) whenever
the preferences fulfil (A1)-(A4).
Before we start observe that we want to determine the utility numbers (9) from
the EU-representation V (·,4 (x, y)) despite the fact that the lotteries inf4 (x, y) and
sup4 (x, y) do not belong to 4 (x, y) for x < y and are therefore not necessarily repre-
sented by V (·,4 (x, y)). Owed to the continuity of V (·,4 (x, y)) on 4 (x, y) this will
be no problem; however, as a consequence our procedure will become technically more
involved.
By constructing (11) for all 4 (x, y) ,4 (x¯, y¯) ∈ Π(ε, η) we will proceed according to
the following sequential order of SL-PL subsets
4 (x1, x1) ,4 (x1, x2) ..., ...,4 (x1, xn) ;
4 (x2, x2) ,4 (x2, x3) ...,4 (x2, xn) ;
....;
4 (xn, xn)
That is, we start with
V (inf4 (x1, x1) ,4 (x1, x1)) , V (sup4 (x1, x1) ,4 (x1, x1))
which determines by (8) the utilities V (σ,4 (x1, x1)) for all σ ∈ 4 (x1, x1). In a next
step we presume V (·,4 (x1, x1)) as given and we derive then
V (inf4 (x1, x2) ,4 (x1, x2)) , V (sup4 (x1, x2) ,4 (x1, x2))
17
such that (10) will be fulfilled with 4 (x, y) = 4 (x1, x1) and 4 (x¯, y¯) = 4 (x1, x2). This
procedure is repeated until we derive the utility numbers (11) for4 (x, y) = 4 (xn−1, x1)
and 4 (x¯, y¯) = 4 (xn, xn). Moreover, observe that we have by transitivity of  : if
(10) is fulfilled for 4 (x, y) = 4 (xk, xk) and 4 (x¯, y¯) = 4 (xk+1, xk+1) as well as for
4 (x, y) = 4 (xk+1, xk+1) and 4 (x¯, y¯) = 4 (xk+2, xk+2) then (10) is also fulfilled for
4 (x, y) = 4 (xk, xk) and 4 (x¯, y¯) = 4 (xk+2, xk+2).
Thus, after having derived the utility numbers (11) fulfilling (10) for all4 (1, y) ,4 (1, y¯) ∈
Π(ε, η) we consider now additionally all 4 (2, y) ,4 (2, y¯) ∈ Π(ε, η). At first we would
let 4 (x¯, y¯) = 4 (x2, x2) and 4 (x, y) = 4 (x1, xk) with k being the smallest number
in {1, ..., n} such that some lottery in 4 (x1, xk) will be preferred to some lottery in
4 (x2, x2). In a next step we would let 4 (x, y) = 4 (x2, x2) and 4 (x¯, y¯) = 4 (x2, x3).
Finally we will derive
V (inf4 (xn, xn) ,4 (xn, xn)) , V (sup4 (xn, xn) ,4 (xn, xn))
such that (10) is fulfilled for all 4 (x, y) ,4 (x¯, y¯) ∈ Π(ε, η).
Having sketched the whole procedure we describe now in some detail how the utility
numbers
V (inf4 (x1, x1) ,4 (x1, x1)) , V (sup4 (x1, x1) ,4 (x1, x1))
V (inf4 (x1, x2) ,4 (x1, x2)) , V (sup4 (x1, x2) ,4 (x1, x2))
can be derived. An application of the same reasoning to the remaining subsets will be
straightforward and is therefore omitted.
Let
V (inf4 (x1, x1) ,4 (x1, x1)) = 0
V (sup4 (x1, x1) ,4 (x1, x1)) = 1
If the preferences do not overlap we simply apply (12) to obtain
V (inf4 (x1, x2) ,4 (x1, x2)) = 1
V (sup4 (x1, x2) ,4 (x1, x2)) = 2
and check whether there is no ρ′ ∈ 4 (x1, x3) such that σ  ρ′ for some σ ∈ 4 (x1, x2);
and so forth.
Suppose now there was a ρ′ ∈ 4 (x1, x2) such that σ  ρ′ for some σ ∈ 4 (x1, x1).
By step 1 there must exist σ′, τ ′ ∈ 4 (x1, x2) and τ ∗ ∈ 4 (x1, x1) such that
τ ∗ ∼ τ ′  σ′  inf4 (x1, x1)
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and
V (σ′,4 (x1, x2)) = V (σ∗,4 (x1, x1))
V (τ ′,4 (x1, x2)) = V (τ ∗,4 (x1, x1))
Having determined the utilities of σ′, τ ′ ∈ 4 (x1, x2) w.r.t. utility numbers assigned
to lotteries in 4 (x1, x1) we proceed now by deriving
V (inf4 (x1, x2) ,4 (x1, x2)) , V (sup4 (x1, x2) ,4 (x1, x2))
from V (σ′,4 (x1, x2)) and V (τ ′,4 (x1, x2)).
Construct the sequence of lotteries (τk)k∈N such that
τk =
1
k + 1
· τ ′ ⊕
(
1− 1
k + 1
)
· sup4 (x1, x2)
and verify: τk ∈ 4 (x1, x2), τk  τ ′, τk+1  τk for all k ∈ N, and
lim
k→∞
τk = sup4 (x1, x2)
Define now νk ∈ (0, 1) for each τk, k ∈ N, implicitly by
τ ′ ∼ νk · τk ⊕ (1− νk) · σ′
and observe that νk is indeed well-defined as a unique number for every τk by (A3).
By (A4) the induced sequence (νk)k∈N is monotonically decreasing and because it is
bounded from below by zero there must exist a unique limit-point ν∗ = limk→∞ νk.
By continuity of V (·,4 (x, y)) on 4 (x, y) we obtain
V (τ ′,4 (x1, x2)) = lim
k→∞
V (νk · τk ⊕ (1− νk) · σ′,4 (x1, x2))
= V (ν∗ · sup4 (x1, x2)⊕ (1− ν∗) · σ′,4 (x1, x2))
= ν∗ ∗ V (sup4 (x1, x2) ,4 (x1, x2)) + (1− ν∗) ∗ V (σ′,4 (x1, x2))
Rearranging gives
V (sup4 (x1, x2) ,4 (x1, x2)) = 1
ν∗
∗ V (τ ′,4 (x1, x2))− (1− ν
∗)
ν∗
∗ V (σ′,4 (x1, x2))
But this is our desired result.
Consider now the sequence (σk)k∈N such that
σk =
1
k + 1
· σ′ ⊕
(
1− 1
k + 1
)
· inf4 (x1, x2)
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and verify: σk ∈ 4 (x1, x2), σ′  σk , σk  σk+1 for all k ∈ N, and
lim
k→∞
σk = inf4 (x1, x2)
Define µk ∈ (0, 1) for each σk, k ∈ N, implicitly by
σ′ ∼ µk · σk ⊕ (1− µk) · τ ′
The induced sequence (µk)k∈N is then monotonically increasing by (A4) and bounded
from above by one such that there exists a unique limit-point µ∗ = limk→∞ µk. By
continuity of V (·,4 (x, y)) on 4 (x, y)
V (σ′,4 (x1, x2)) = µ∗ ∗ V (inf4 (x1, x2) ,4 (x1, x2)) + (1− µ∗) ∗ V (τ ′,4 (x1, x2))
and rearranging gives the desired result
V (inf4 (x1, x2) ,4 (x1, x2)) = 1
µ∗
∗ V (σ′,4 (x1, x2))− (1− µ
∗)
µ∗
∗ V (τ ′,4 (x1, x2))
Finally, observe how we can now just compute backwards to express the utilities of
σ′ and τ ′ by (8)
V (σ′,4 (x1, x2))
=
µ∗
ν∗ + µ∗ − ν∗µ∗ ∗ V (inf4 (x1, x2) ,4 (x1, x2)) +
(1− µ∗) ∗ ν∗
ν∗ + µ∗ − ν∗µ∗ ∗ V (sup4 (x1, x2) ,4 (x1, x2))
and
V (τ ′,4 (x1, x2))
=
(1− ν∗) ∗ µ∗
ν∗ + µ∗ − ν∗µ∗ ∗ V (inf4 (x1, x2) ,4 (x1, x2)) +
ν∗
ν∗ + µ∗ − ν∗µ∗ ∗ V (sup4 (x1, x2) ,4 (x1, x2))
Part B.We demonstrate now that all subset-dependent EU-functionals V (·,4 (x, y)),
4 (x, y) ∈ Π(ε, η), have to satisfy (4) whenever the preferences fulfil (A1)-(A4). The
proof for (5) is analog and therefore omitted.
Suppose on the contrary that there is some sequence (σk)k∈N with limk→∞ σk = σ
such that σk ∈ 4 (x, y) for all k ∈ N and σ ∈ 4 (x¯, y¯) and we have
lim
k→∞
V (σk,4 (x, y)) > V (σ,4 (x¯, y¯)) (17)
for x¯ ≥ x, y¯ ≥ y, and 4 (x, y) 6= 4 (x¯, y¯).
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Recall that sup4 (x¯, y¯) FOSD σ, for all σ ∈ 4 (x¯, y¯) with σ 6= sup4 (x¯, y¯). Observe
now that for all λ ∈ (0, 1)
λ · sup4 (x¯, y¯)⊕ (1− λ) · σ ∈ 4 (x¯, y¯)
and by continuity of V (·,4 (x¯, y¯)) there must exist under assumption (17) some λ ∈
(0, 1) such that
lim
k→∞
V (σk,4 (x, y)) > V (λ · τ ⊕ (1− λ) · σ,4 (x¯, y¯)) (18)
Quasiconcavity of FOSD implies
λ · τ ⊕ (1− λ) · σ FOSD σ
By continuity of FOSDthere is some M ∈ N such that
λ · τ ⊕ (1− λ) · σ FOSD σk
for all k ≥M . And by (A4)
V (λ · τ ⊕ (1− λ) · σ,4 (x¯, y¯)) > V (σk,4 (x, y))
for all k ≥M . Thus
V (λ · τ ⊕ (1− λ) · σ,4 (x¯, y¯)) ≥ lim
k→∞
V (σk,4 (x, y))
A contradiction to (18).
Part C. After having proved that all preferences fulfilling (A1)-(A4) are repre-
sentable by (2) it remains to prove the converse; i.e., any utility function (2) represents
some preferences that fulfil (A1)-(A4). This is easily checked for the axioms (A1)-(A3),
and therefore omitted. Let us now prove that the conditions (4) and (5) are sufficient
for guaranteeing (A4).
Suppose on the contrary that there are σ, τ ∈ 4 (X) such that τ FOSD σ but
U (σ) > U (τ) (19)
Observe at first that by construction of Π (ε, η): τ FOSD σ only if σ ∈ 4 (x, y)
and τ ∈ 4 (x¯, y¯) with x¯ ≥ x and y¯ ≥ y. Moreover, the SL-PL subset dependent EU-
representation V (·,4 (x, y)) implies that there can not occur a violation of monotonicity
w.r.t. FOSD for any σ, τ ∈ 4 (x, y). Thus, (A4) can only be violated if σ ∈ 4 (x, y)
and τ ∈ 4 (x¯, y¯) with x¯ ≥ x and y¯ ≥ y, and 4 (x, y) 6= 4 (x¯, y¯).
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Construct now the net (τλ)λ∈(0,1) such that
τλ = (1− λ) · τ ⊕ λ · σ
and observe that by quasiconcavity of FOSD:
τ FOSD τλ FOSD τµ
for all µ ∈ (0, 1] if µ > λ. By construction of Π (ε, η) there must exist a unique λ∗ such
that either
(i.) τλ∗ ∈ 4 (x¯, y¯) and τλ ∈ 4 (x, y) for all λ > λ∗, or
(ii.) τλ∗ ∈ 4 (x, y) and τλ ∈ 4 (x¯, y¯) for all λ < λ∗.
Let us consider case (i) where sequences in4 (x, y) may have a limit-point in4 (x¯, y¯)
but not vice versa. (Case (ii.) is analogously proved via condition (5) and therefore
omitted.)
Construct the sequence (σk)k∈N such that
σk =
(
1− 1
k
)
· τλ∗ ⊕ 1
k
· σ
and observe that σk+1  σk by (A2) which implies
V (σk+1,4 (x, y)) = U (σk+1) ≥ U (σk) = V (σk,4 (x, y))
since σk+1, σk ∈ 4 (x, y) for all k ∈ N. Thus,
lim
k→∞
V (σk,4 (x, y)) = V (τλ∗ ,4 (x, y)) ≥ V (σ,4 (x, y))
Analogously
V (τ,4 (x¯, y¯)) = U (τ) ≥ U (τλ∗) = V (τλ∗ ,4 (x¯, y¯))
The condition (4) claims now
V (τλ∗ ,4 (x¯, y¯)) ≥ V (τλ∗ ,4 (x, y))
and we obtain
U (τ) ≥ U (σ)
A contradiction to (19).
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Figure 1.  By a security effect S1 is indifferent to the points on the indifference
curve (i1) to the effect that S1 is preferred to R1. But then the existing SL,PL-models re-
quire S3 to be indifferent to the points on (i2). Thus, S3 must be preferred to R3. A viola-
tion of the choice pattern (S1,R2,R3).
($0•1)S1
Figure 2.  By a potential effect Q1 is indifferent to the points on (i1), i.e., Q1 is preferred to
T1 but not to T2. Moreover, Q3, being indifferent to the points on (i2), must be preferred to
T3 - a violation of the choice pattern (Q1,T2,T3).
R1 R2
S2
S3
R3
(i1)
(i2)($5M•1)
($0•1)Q1,Q2
T2
T3
Q3
T1
(i1)
(i2)
($100•1)
Figure 3.  Introduction of a threshold for security levels and steeper slopes of the indiffe-
rence curves on higher security levels can accommodate the choice pattern (S1,R2,R3).
($0•1)S1
Figure 4. A threshold for security levels allows for the choice pattern (Q1,T2,T3). The slo-
pes of the indifference curves may be the same for all security levels.
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